Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 1 Fall

Article 10

Leveling the Playing Field Among the NFL, Clubs,
and Players--By Amending the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act
Alicia J. Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons
Repository Citation
Alicia J. Anderson, Leveling the Playing Field Among the NFL, Clubs, and Players--By Amending the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 26 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 199 (2015)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol26/iss1/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

ANDERSON ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

12/16/2015 2:09 PM

COMMENTS

LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
AMONG THE NFL, CLUBS, AND
PLAYERS—BY AMENDING THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT
ALICIA J. ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Football League (NFL) consists of thirty-two teams within
eight divisions.1 Approximately 45.7 million people tuned in for the 2014 NFL
Draft,2 and 114.4 million people watched Super Bowl XLIX.3 Of the five major
professional sports leagues in North America—the NFL, Major League
Baseball, Major League Soccer, the National Hockey League, and the National
Basketball Association—the NFL outranked all the leagues in average per game
attendance by more than 35,000 attendees during the 2013–2014 season, with
an average attendance of 68,397 people.4 The NFL currently achieves $10

*A third-year student at Marquette University Law School (Class of 2016) and currently serves as
the Executive Editor on the Marquette Sports Law Review. She graduated cum laude from the
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay in 2012, where she earned a B.S. in Social Change and
Development, with an emphasis in Law and Justice Studies. Alicia would like to thank Professor Paul
Secunda for his guidance while writing this Comment.
1. NFL Teams, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
2. 2014 NFL Draft Watched by a Record 45.7 Million Viewers, NFL (May 12, 2014),
http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/0ap2000000349728/article/2014-nfl-draft-watched-by-a-record-457million-viewers. A blustering 7.03 million viewers tuned in for the first day of the 2015 NFL Draft.
Dominic Patten, NFL Draft Day 1 Watched by 7.03M; Third Best Result Ever, DEADLINE (May 1,
2015), http://deadline.com/2015/05/nfl-draft-ratings-espn-down-viewership-1201419142/.
3. Frank Pallotta, Super Bowl XLIX Posts the Largest Audience in TV History, CNNMONEY (Feb.
2, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/02/media/super-bowl-ratings/.
4. Average Per Game Attendance of the Five Major Sports Leagues in North America
2014/15, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/207458/per-game-attendance-of-major-ussports-leagues/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (noting that Major League Baseball is the second highest
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billion in annual revenue,5 with the Dallas Cowboys as the highest valued club
at $4 billion.6 However, a more startling statistic arises from the period between
January 24, 2000, and October 15, 2015, during which time over 800 NFL
players were arrested.7
Despite the NFL’s popularity, it is afflicted with excessive instances of
player misconduct, including drunk driving, drug and alcohol abuse, domestic
violence, child abuse, sexual assault, and murder.8 Yet, regardless of a player’s
misconduct while playing in the NFL, he is still able to receive retirement
benefits, which can result in a substantial amount of money upon attaining
retirement age. It does not seem fair or equitable that a player who engages in
misconduct, harming the NFL or a particular NFL club’s image, is still able to
retain retirement benefits that were intended to reward that player for faithful
employment.
The NFL’s retirement plan is regulated by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),9 a federal act, which forbids withholding or
forfeiting retirement benefits because an employee engages in objectionable
acts or misconduct. This Comment proposes that Congress should amend
ERISA to allow an employer, such as the NFL, to withhold retirement benefits
for employee misconduct. Section II discusses the NFL’s retirement plan and
benefits that players currently enjoy. Section III provides several recent
examples of current and former NFL players who engaged in misconduct.
Section IV explains how ERISA regulates private employment-provided
retirement plans. Finally, Section V proposes several solutions for how
Congress can reduce employee misconduct within the NFL and other
employment realms by amending ERISA. While it is unlikely that withholding
retirement benefits will completely eliminate player misconduct in the NFL, a
misconduct exception would ensure retribution against players who no longer
deserve benefits intended for faithful employment. As such, amending ERISA
would promote equitable relationships between employers and employees,

ranked league with an average of 30,437 attendees per game).
5. Brent Schrotenboer, NFL Takes Aim at $25 Billion, but at What Price?, USA TODAY (Feb. 5,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/super/2014/01/30/super-bowl-nfl-revenue-denverbroncos-seattle-seahawks/5061197/.
6. The Business of Football, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/list/ (last visited Dec.
14, 2015).
7. Brent Schrotenboer, NFL Player Arrests, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nfl/arrests/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (compiling “arrests, charges and citations of NFL players for crimes
more serious than common traffic violations”).
8. See generally id.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1381 (1976).
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including within the NFL.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE NFL’S RETIREMENT PLAN AND BENEFITS
The NFL provides its players with several retirement plans and benefits,
which are contained within the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement. The
retirement plans include the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan
and the NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan.
A. The NFL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement
The current collective bargaining agreement (NFL CBA) between the NFL
and National Football League Players Association (NFLPA), the union for
professional football players,10 became effective on August 4, 2011.11 The NFL
CBA and its terms pertain to current NFL players, previous NFL players, rookie
NFL players selected in the NFL Draft, and undrafted NFL rookie players who
commence negotiations with an NFL club.12 The NFL CBA contains a wide
breadth of terms and conditions between the NFL and NFLPA, including
players’ contracts, compensation, performance, and injury protection, among
many others.13 However, this Comment is concerned with the NFL CBA only
as it relates to retirement benefits provided by the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL
Player Retirement Plan and the NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan.14
B. The Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan
Between 1962 and 1987, NFL players were eligible to receive pension
retirement benefits under the Bert Bell NFL Retirement Plan (Bert Bell Plan).15
At the end of the 1982 collective bargaining agreement, the NFLPA and the
National Football League Management Council failed to reach a new agreement
concerning pension benefits.16 Subsequently, the Pete Rozelle NFL Player
Retirement Plan (Pete Rozelle Plan) was created in 1989 to offer pension

10. About the NFLPA, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://nflpa.com/about (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
11. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT pmbl. (2011), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf [hereinafter
NFL CBA].
12. Id.
13. See generally NFL CBA, supra note 11.
14. See id. arts. 53–54.
15. BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAN 1 (2007),
http://nflretired.baughweb.com/Resources/BertBellPlans/2007Bert%20Bell%20Pete%20Rozelle.pdf
[hereinafter RETIREMENT PLAN].
16. Id.
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retirement benefits to NFL players.17 Under the 1993 collective bargaining
agreement, the Bert Bell Plan and Pete Rozelle Plan were merged to create the
Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan (Retirement Plan).18
Subsequent collective bargaining agreements amended the Retirement Plan, but
it remains the current retirement plan agreement between the NFL and
NFLPA.19
The Retirement Plan is comprised of contributions made by individual NFL
teams, which are used exclusively to provide retirement benefits to vested
players.20 To become vested in retirement benefits, players must have (1) three
or more credited seasons, including at least one season after the 1992 season;
(2) four or more credited seasons, including at least one season after the 1973
season; or (3) five or more credited seasons.21 After a player becomes vested in
his retirement benefits, he is eligible to receive those benefits at the age of
fifty-five.22 Vested players have a non-forfeitable right to their benefits,
whereas non-vested players’ benefits are forfeitable.23
For each credited season, a player will receive a monthly amount in
retirement benefits,24 which will continue for the entirety of his lifetime.25 The
monthly amounts a vested player may receive per credited season are (1) $250:
before 1982; (2) $255: 1982 through 1992; (3) $265: 1993 through 1994; (4)
$315: 1995 through 1996; (5) $365: 1997; (6) $470: 1998 through 2011; (7)
$560: 2012 through 2014; (8) $660: 2015 through 2017; and (9) $760: 2018
through 2020.26 For example, a player who obtains credited seasons from 1992
through 2000 will receive a total monthly credit of $3,190, based on the credited

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAN: RETIREMENT PLAYBOOK
SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION 37–38, 43 (2013), https://nflparesources.blob.core.windows.net/mediaresources/files/PDFs/Benefits/Bell_Rozelle_Retirement_SPDf.pdf [hereinafter RETIREMENT PLAN
SPD].
21. RETIREMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 6.
22. RETIREMENT PLAN SPD, supra note 20, at 9–10. It is also worth noting that early retirement at
the age of forty-five is possible if a player is vested and has a credited season prior to 1993, although
the monthly benefit amount will be reduced. Id. at 10. Additionally, vested players may choose to
defer their retirement benefits until age sixty-five, which would increase the monthly benefit amount.
Id.
23. RETIREMENT PLAN, supra note 15, at 7.
24. Id. at 10.
25. George Earl Koonce, Jr., Role Transition of National Football League Retired Athletes: A
Grounded Theory Approach, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 249, 281 (2013).
26. NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 53.
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season amounts of $255 + $265 + $265 + $315 + $315 + $365 + $470 + $470 +
$470.27
In addition to the retirement benefits described above, the Retirement Plan
also provides disability benefits to vested players who are permanently or totally
disabled and death benefits to a player’s widow and minor children.28 Based on
estimates in 2009, the Retirement Plan held $800 million in assets and paid $6.5
million in benefits each month.29
C. The NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan
NFL players also receive retirement benefits under the NFL Player Second
Career Savings Plan (Savings Plan), which is a 401(k) plan.30 A player can
contribute to his individual 401(k) plan if he earns a credited season that year
and also during a prior year.31 An NFL club will make a matching contribution
of two dollars for every one dollar a player contributes to his 401(k) plan.32
However, even if a player does not make a contribution, or makes only a small
contribution, to his individual 401(k) plan, an NFL team will still contribute at
least (1) $3,600 for any player who earns a credited season during that plan year
and has at least three credited seasons; (2) $7,200 for any player who earns a
credited season that plan year and has exactly two credited seasons; or (3)
$1,000 for any player who earns exactly one credited season.33 The Savings
Plan is reported to have more than 7,700 participants and over $1.6 billion in
plan assets.34

27. Koonce, supra note 25, at 281. If the same player takes early retirement at age forty-five, he
will only receive a monthly amount of $1,442, whereas if he takes deferred retirement at age sixty-five,
he will receive $8,335 a month. Id.; see also RETIREMENT PLAN SPD, supra note 20, at 11–12
(illustrating monthly amounts a vested player may receive based on varying factors).
28. RETIREMENT PLAN SPD, supra note 20, at 1, 18, 33.
29. Michael Lydakis & Andrew Zapata, Tackling the Issues: The History of the National Football
League’s 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and What It Means for the Future of the Sport, 10
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 17, 29 (2012).
30. NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 54. See generally NFL PLAYER SECOND CAREER SAVINGS PLAN:
401K PLAYBOOK SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION (2012), https://nflparesources.blob.core.windows.net/mediaresources/files/PDFs/Benefits/SCS_SPD.pdf [hereinafter SAVINGS PLAN SPD].
31. SAVINGS PLAN SPD, supra note 30, at 7.
32. Id. at 8; NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 54. A maximum limit is placed on matching contributions
an NFL club may contribute to a player’s 401(k) plan, including a maximum of $24,000 for plan years
2011–2014; $26,000 for plan years 2015–2018; and $28,000 for plan years 2019–2020. SAVINGS PLAN
SPD, supra note 30, at 8.
33. NFL CBA, supra note 11, art. 54; see also SAVINGS PLAN SPD, supra note 30, at 8.
34. Savings Board of the NFL Player Second Career Savings Plan, BRIGHTSCOPE,
http://www.brightscope.com/401k-rating/252010/Savings-Board-Of-The-Nfl-Player-Second-CareerSavings-Plan/256087/Nfl-Player-Second-Career-Savings-Plan/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
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Under the Savings Plan, players are fully vested in their 401(k) account
plans, meaning the retirement benefit rights are non-forfeitable.35 A player is
eligible to receive Savings Plan benefits upon attaining age forty-five but cannot
continue to defer distribution once reaching age sixty-five.36 Further, if a player
dies prior to receiving the entirety of the balance in his individual 401(k) plan,
his spouse is eligible to receive the remaining balance.37
D. Retirement for NFL Players
Although professional football players experience many benefits while
playing in the NFL, including large salaries and bonuses,38 many players have
found life after the NFL to be a difficult transition.39 Former linebacker for the
Green Bay Packers George Koonce explained that for the majority of NFL
players, retirement occurs due to injuries, making a player feel as though he has
less “control over [his] life and career decisions.”40 Retired players often
experience depression and feelings of rejection.41 Moreover, a player exit
survey showed that 69% of players who left the NFL in 2006 did so without a
job.42 Players with health issues often encounter large medical bills but only
have health insurance through the NFL for a short time after retirement.43
Moreover, despite players’ large salaries while playing in the NFL, only
two years after retirement, 78% were “bankrupt or . . . under financial stress
because of joblessness or divorce.”44 So while it may be easy for a current NFL
player to discount retirement benefits as unimportant or inconsequential, a

35. SAVINGS PLAN SPD, supra note 30, at 10, 23 (noting two exceptions: (1) when a player elects
to withdraw from automatic enrollment and (2) if a player cannot be found by the Plan Office).
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 17.
38. See NFL Salary Rankings, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/rankings/base/ (last visited
Dec. 14, 2015) (listing the highest 2015 base salary at $16 million for Darrelle Revis, cornerback for
the New York Jets); NFL Salary Rankings, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/rankings/signingcash/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (listing the highest 2015 signing bonuses at $31 million for Russell
Wilson, quarterback for the Seattle Seahawks, and Ben Roethlisberger, quarterback for the Pittsburgh
Steelers, and Eli Manning, quarterback for the New York Giants).
39. See generally Koonce, supra note 25.
40. Id. at 276.
41. Id. at 277.
42. Id. at 279.
43. Id. at 282 (explaining how former player for the Cincinnati Bengals Reggie Williams
accumulated $500,000 in medical expenses from his knee injuries—none of which were covered by the
NFL’s disability benefits).
44. Pablo S. Torre, How [and Why] Athletes Go Broke, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://www.si.com/vault/2009/03/23/105789480/how-and-why-athletes-go-broke#.
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player should consider the startling realization that life after the NFL is not
always easy, especially if he has no retirement benefits to rely on.
III. ISSUES OF PLAYER MISCONDUCT PLAGUING THE NFL
Although player misconduct is not a recent phenomenon in the NFL—one
need only revisit the case of former New England Patriots linebacker Eric
Naposki, who murdered his lover’s boyfriend in 1994,45 or former Carolina
Panthers wide receiver Rae Carruth, who conspired to have his pregnant
girlfriend murdered in 199946—it seems that instances of wrongdoing by NFL
players are constantly in the news.
In September 2014, a video of Ray Rice, former running back for the
Baltimore Ravens, was posted online that showed Rice punching his
then-fiancée in the face, knocking her to the ground, and dragging her from the
elevator where the incident occurred.47
Also in September 2014, Adrian Peterson, running back for the Minnesota
Vikings, was indicted by a grand jury in Montgomery County, Texas, for
“reckless or negligent injury to a child” after Peterson hit his son with a switch
to discipline him.48 The child’s injuries included “bruises and lacerations on
[his] back, legs, arms and buttocks,” which a doctor confirmed “[were]
consistent with child abuse.”49 Peterson later accepted a plea deal that reduced
his charges to a single misdemeanor “charge of reckless assault.”50

45. Eric Naposki Gets Life in Prison: Ex-NFL Player Sentenced for Murder, HUFFPOST SPORTS
(Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/eric-naposki-life-prison-murder-sentence_n_1765638.html.
46. Kevin Armstrong, End Zone: Carruth and Consequences, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/zone-carruth-consequences-article-1.1576536
(last
updated Jan. 11, 2014); Once Promising NFL Player Rae Carruth Now a Prison Janitor, ABC NEWS
(June 30, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/promising-nfl-player-rae-carruth-now-prison-janitor/story?id=24368134.
47.
Video
of
Ray
Rice
Punch
Released,
ESPN
(Sept.
8,
2014),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11486837/new-video-released-baltimore-ravens-ray-rice-hitting-fiancee. Rice was suspended indefinitely from the NFL for his actions; however, he later won his appeal
of the decision, prompting his reinstatement to the NFL. Ray Rice Wins Appeal, Eligible to Sign, ESPN
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11949855/ray-rice-baltimore-ravens-wins-appeal-eligible-reinstatement.
48. Steve DiMatteo, A Timeline of the Adrian Peterson Child Abuse Case, SBNATION (Sept. 17,
2014), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/9/17/6334793/adrian-peterson-child-abuse-statement-vikingstimeline.
49. Id.
50. Lynn Zinser, Adrian Peterson Agrees to Plea Deal in Child-Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/sports/football/vikings-adrian-peterson-reaches-pleadeal-in-child-abuse-case.html.
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Wes Welker, wide receiver for the St. Louis Rams, was suspended for the
first four games of the 2014 season after testing positive for amphetamines,
violating the NFL’s drug policy.51
Josh Gordon, wide receiver for the Cleveland Browns, was charged with
drunk driving after being pulled over for driving fifteen miles per hour over the
posted speed limit in July 2014.52 Gordon also failed a drug test when he tested
positive for marijuana.53 Gordon previously violated the NFL’s drug policy
during the 2013 season.54
In July 2014, Greg Hardy, defensive end for the Dallas Cowboys, was found
guilty of assaulting and threatening a female.55 The attack occurred in Hardy’s
apartment where Hardy placed his hands around her neck and threatened to kill
her.56
Former defensive end for the San Francisco 49ers Ray McDonald was
arrested for felony domestic violence in August 201457 after a woman alleged
McDonald sexually assaulted her.58
On April 15, 2015, Aaron Hernandez, former tight end for the New England
Patriots, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison
without parole for a 2013 shooting.59 At the time of this writing, Hernandez still

51. Kevin Clark, Broncos’ Wes Welker Suspended Four Games After Drug Test, WALL STREET J.
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/broncos-wes-welker-suspended-four-games-after-drugtest-1409703724.
52.
Browns’
Josh
Gordon
Arrested,
ESPN
(July
7,
2014),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11178895/josh-gordon-cleveland-browns-arrested-dwi.
53. Mike Florio, Josh Gordon Will Be Suspended 10 Games Under New Drug Policy,
PROFOOTBALLTALK (Sept. 12, 2014), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/09/12/josh-gordonwill-be-suspended-10-games-under-new-drug-policy/.
54. Toucher: Josh Gordon’s One-Year Marijuana Suspension Ridiculous, CBS BOS. (Aug. 28,
2014), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2014/08/28/toucher-josh-gordons-one-year-marijuana-suspensionridiculous/.
55.
Greg
Hardy
Found
Guilty
of
Assault,
ESPN
(July
16,
2014),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11220817/greg-hardy-carolina-panthers-guilty-2-counts-domesticviolence.
56. Id.
57. Dan Hanzus, Ray McDonald Arrested on Domestic Violence Charges, NFL (Aug. 31, 2014),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000386508/article/ray-mcdonald-arrested-on-domestic-violence-charges. The charges against McDonald were later dropped due to “insufficient evidence.”
Lindsay H. Jones, 49ers’ Ray McDonald Won’t Be Charged in Domestic Violence Case, USA TODAY
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/49ers/2014/11/10/ray-mcdonald-notcharged-felony-domestic-violence-assault/18801223/.
58. Lindsay H. Jones, New Details Emerge Around Ray McDonald Sexual Assault Allegations, USA
TODAY (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/12/22/ray-mcdonald-49erssexual-assault-accuastion/20777737/.
59. Susan Candiotti, Laura Dolan & Ray Sanchez, Aaron Hernandez Verdict: Guilty of Murder,
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faces two additional murder charges for a shooting he committed in 2012.60
On June 15, 2015, Darren Sharper, former safety for the New Orleans
Saints, pleaded guilty to three rape charges, arising from incidents in Louisiana,
California, Nevada, and Arizona,61 where Sharper drugged and raped women
while they were under the influence of the drugs he placed in their drinks.62
Sharper will serve ten years in federal prison.63
The multitude of negative activity occurring among current and former NFL
players prompts the question of what the NFL can do to deter such misconduct.
Some suggestions include making the NFL Code of Conduct more specific,
disciplining teams and players, creating a league-wide concussion policy (to
ensure players’ judgment is not affected), and implementing a three-strike
policy (imposing a one-season suspension after three transgressions).64 While
such suggestions may be effective and beneficial for the NFL, NFL clubs, and
NFL players, this Comment explores an additional solution to deter bad
behavior among NFL players and also to ensure equitable employment
relationships—by forfeiting players’ retirement benefits for misconduct.
IV. FEDERAL REGULATION OF RETIREMENT PLANS AND BENEFITS
To understand the implications of this argument, it is necessary to
understand the federal statute that regulates the NFL’s Retirement Plan and
Savings Plan.65 ERISA was enacted to deal with a multitude of issues
concerning private employment retirement plans and benefits, including
vesting, funding, and fiduciary duties and responsibilities.66 Because ERISA is
a very complex statute, the explanation of its implications is limited to the extent
it applies to this Comment.

CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/15/us/aaron-hernandez-verdict/ (last updated Apr. 16, 2015).
60. Michelle R. Smith, Aaron Hernandez to Face Boston Double Murder Charges Next, HUFFPOST
CRIME (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/15/aaron-hernandez-double-murder_n_7072022.html.
61. Elliott Smith, Darren Sharper Pleads Guilty to 3 Rape Charges in Four-State Deal, CBSSPORTS
(June 15, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/25214990/former-saints-cb-darrensharper-pleads-guilty-to-3-more-rapes.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Joel Michael Ugolini, Even a Violent Game Has Its Limits: A Look at the NFL’s Responsibility
for the Behavior of Its Players, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 41, 54–57 (2007).
65. See RETIREMENT PLAN SPD, supra note 20, at 50–52; SAVINGS PLAN SPD, supra note 30, at
26–27 (discussing a player’s ERISA rights).
66. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)–(c) (1976); see also COLLEEN
E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 10–13 (3d ed.
2011).

ANDERSON ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

208

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/16/2015 2:09 PM

[Vol. 26:1

A. Multiemployer Retirement Plans
ERISA regulates different types of retirement plans; however, the type of
plan relevant to the NFL is a multiemployer plan. A multiemployer plan “is
sponsored by more than one employer pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement.”67 Accordingly, multiemployer plans are “administered by a board
of trustees comprised of an equal number of representatives from management
and labor.”68 As discussed above, the relationship between the NFL and
NFLPA is governed by the NFL CBA, making the Retirement Plan and Savings
Plan subject to regulation by ERISA as multiemployer plans.69
B. Vesting Rights and the Anti-Alienation Rule Under ERISA
Vesting concerns an employee’s non-forfeitable right to retirement benefits:
once an employee becomes vested in retirement benefits, those benefits cannot
be taken from that employee.70 Forfeiture for misconduct is permissible, so long
as an employee has not yet vested in the retirement benefits.71 However, ERISA
precludes alienation or assignment of an employee’s benefits, meaning an
employee cannot voluntarily assign retirement benefits to a third party and
retirement benefits must be paid directly to an employee (i.e., not to an
employee’s creditors).72 ERISA requires that benefits are held in trust and used
for “the exclusive purpose[] of providing benefits to participants in the plan and

67. MEDILL, supra note 66, at 33.
68. Id.; see also RETIREMENT PLAN SPD, supra note 20, at 40; SAVINGS PLAN SPD, supra note 30,
at 20 (explaining that the Retirement Plan and Savings Plan are “administered by [a] . . . Board of
Trustees[]” comprised of six voting members, with three members each “selected by the NFLPA and .
. . the NFL Management Council[ and t]he Commissioner serving” as “a nonvoting member” and the
Chairman).
69. See RETIREMENT PLAN SPD, supra note 20, at 40 (stating “[t]he Retirement Plan is a
multiemployer defined benefit pension plan”) (emphasis added); SAVINGS PLAN SPD, supra note 30,
at 20 (stating “[t]he Savings Plan is a multiemployer-defined contribution plan”) (emphasis added).
70. MEDILL, supra note 66, at 11.
71. See Mary F. Radford, Implied Exceptions to the ERISA Prohibitions Against the Forfeiture and
Alienation of Retirement Plan Interests, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 685, 708–09 (explaining that the Internal
Revenue Service appears to permit “bad boy clauses” if an employee is not yet vested in retirement
benefits).
72. MEDILL, supra note 66, at 216–17. Specific exceptions to the anti-alienation rule include the
following:
(1) A loan . . . from assets held in [a] participant’s plan account.
(2) A voluntary and revocable assignment made by a participant to a third party of
not
more
than
10%
of
any
benefit
payment
.
.
.
.
(3) A state or federal court order, judgment, consent decree, or settlement agreement . . . .
(4) A payment . . . to an alternate payee pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.

Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
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their beneficiaries.”73 If a retirement plan does not satisfy the trust requirement,
it is not considered a “qualified plan” and thus will not receive favorable tax
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code.74 As such, an employer has an
incentive to avoid violating the anti-alienation rule and to ensure it maintains a
qualified plan.75
C. ERISA’s Preemption Power over State Laws
It is also important to note that ERISA has preemption power over state
laws regulating private retirement plans and benefits.76 Specifically, section
514(a) of ERISA states, “[T]he provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan.”77 In earlier decisions, the Supreme Court interpreted
the “relate to” language in section 514(a) broadly to mean any “state law [that]
has a connection with . . . or . . . reference to an employee benefit plan.”78
Despite its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court later determined its broad
interpretation of section 514(a) led to over-reaching results with no stopping
point.79 The Court explained Congress did not intend to disregard the limiting
language of section 514(a) by preempting state laws that have “only a tenuous,
remote, or peripheral connection with [employee benefit] plans,” especially if a
state law was historically “a matter of local concern.”80 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Travelers Insurance Co. created a presumption against preemption
when a state law regulates an area of traditional state concern.81 Further, to
determine if a state law has a “connection with” an employee benefit plan, the
Travelers Insurance Co. analysis asks whether a state law affects plan
administration and regulation too much or only indirectly.82 If a state law

73. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (c)(1) (1976).
74. MEDILL, supra note 66, at 94–95.
75. Id. at 95.
76. Id. at 651.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
78. MEDILL, supra note 66, at 655 (referencing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97
(1983)); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (explaining Congress
used the broad “relate to” language in section 514(a), thus specifically “rejecting more limited
preemption language”); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (noting the “expansive
sweep” of section 514(a)’s broad “relate to” language).
79. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995).
80. Id. at 661.
81. MEDILL, supra note 66, at 674.
82. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 660–62.
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interferes only indirectly with plan administration, it will not be preempted by
ERISA.83 Additionally, the Supreme Court limited the preemption power of the
“reference to” prong created in Shaw by holding a state law is only preempted
when it “acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans” or “where the
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”84
V. A SOLUTION TO THE NFL’S PLAYER MISCONDUCT ISSUE
Despite ERISA’s provisions prohibiting forfeiture of vested retirement benefits, supporting anti-alienation, and preempting state laws, there are several solutions that could reduce NFL player misconduct and promote an equitable employment relationship. Such solutions would allow the NFL or an NFL team to
withdraw a player’s retirement benefits by amending ERISA to allow for the
alienation of retirement benefits for misconduct and certain illegal acts. The
public sector should be used as a guide for amending ERISA.
A. Amending ERISA to Permit Alienation of Benefits for Player Misconduct
Congress should amend ERISA to permit alienation of an employee’s
retirement benefits if that employee engages in misconduct against his
employer. An amendment is necessary because ERISA currently only allows
alienation of benefits for four specific exceptions85 and the Supreme Court
refused to find an implied exception to the anti-alienation rule for employee
fraud or misconduct. Creating such an amendment would create equitable
relationships between employers and employees, by ensuring an employee acts
in the best interest of his employer and abides by his employer’s rules and
policies.
1. The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Find an Implied Misconduct Exception to
the Anti-Alienation Rule
In Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, the employee
pled guilty to violating the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 when he embezzled more than $377,000 from his union.86 While
incarcerated, the employee filed a claim that he was wrongfully denied benefits

83. Id. at 664–65.
84. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)
(holding a California law that permitted lower wages for apprentices did not “reference” an employee
benefit plan because “apprenticeship programs need not necessarily be ERISA plans”).
85. See MEDILL, supra note 66, at 218.
86. 493 U.S. 365, 367 (1990).
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from his pension plan.87 While the Supreme Court recognized the unsatisfactory
result of its decision in granting the employee the benefits,88 it relied heavily on
Congress’s intent to not allow garnishment of benefits in implementing
ERISA’s anti-alienation provision.89 The Supreme Court expressed concern
over a court’s ability to create an exception for employees’ acts of fraud or
misconduct, for it would “swallow the [anti-alienation] rule” and force courts to
decide circumstances that were “‘especially’ inequitable.”90 The Supreme
Court reasoned that such decisions were impracticable; thus, Congress, not
courts, should create exceptions to the anti-alienation provision.91
2. Support for an Exception to the Anti-Alienation Rule
Because of courts’ inability to imply an anti-alienation exception for
employee fraud or misconduct after Guidry,92 Congress should amend ERISA
to allow for such an exception. Several commentators have urged Congress to
amend ERISA to allow for alienation of employee benefits under particular
situations.
One proponent argues Congress should amend ERISA’s anti-alienation
provision to permit an exception when an employee commits fraud or
embezzlement against an employer or retirement plan.93 Several courts prior to
Guidry found an implied exception for fraud under the anti-alienation provision
of ERISA,94 believing Congress could not have intended to protect such
wrongdoers.95 A fraud amendment would provide protection to all employees
in a retirement plan and their employer by permitting an employer to regain
costs imposed on a retirement plan by a wrongdoer who either threatened
continuation of a plan or caused harm to the plan itself.96
Additionally, another proponent argues that while ERISA’s anti-alienation

87. Id. at 368.
88. Id. at 377 (stating “there may be a natural distaste for the result we reach here.”).
89. Id. at 372–73.
90. Id. at 377.
91. Id.
92. See Rodger L. Puz, Recent Decision, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 139, 157, 162–63 (1990); Radford, supra
note 71, at 732.
93. Michael Alan Frazee, Comment, ERISA—Exceptions to the Anti-Alienation Provision:
Strengthening ERISA’s Protection Through a Fraud Amendment, 10 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 341
(1988).
94. Id. at 352.
95. Id. at 353 (referencing Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987), reh’g denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988)).
96. Id. at 353–54.
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provision seems reasonable and even desirable,
to shield pension benefits from an employer who seeks
restitution for willful and often malicious criminal acts that
reduce, either directly or indirectly, the benefits of other law
abiding pensioners or, at the very least, impair the ability of an
employer to make contributions, is contrary not only to notions
of fairness and equity but to policies of ERISA itself.97
Thus, an amendment to the anti-alienation provision should preclude
protection of an employee who is convicted of “an act of fraud, theft,
conversion, or embezzlement . . . which has caused a reduction of plan assets
and/or [sic] a loss to the employer or employee organization.”98 Not permitting
such a provision conflicts with Congress’s intention to protect plan participants
and instead protects those employees who harm their employer, thus reducing
an employer’s ability to contribute to a retirement plan and ultimately harming
other participants.99
Similarly, a third proponent explains that while ERISA’s anti-alienation
provision was intended to protect employees’ retirement benefits, its broad
restrictions also protect certain abuses, thus shifting economic burdens onto
“innocent victim[s].”100 While exceptions to the anti-alienation provision
exist,101 certain abuses are still protected under ERISA, such as employee
criminal misconduct and bankruptcy.102 While the anti-alienation provision was
enacted for beneficial purposes, the provision “allows, and even encourages,
other strains on the economic system and violations of other sacredly held social
policies.”103 The proponent urges Congress to subject employees who engage
in wrongdoing to alienation and its unfavorable effects as “ERISA cannot
choose to economically protect the guilty or irresponsible over the innocent or

97. Charles T. Caliendo, Jr., Note, Removing the “Natural Distaste” from the Mouth of the Supreme
Court with a Criminal Fraud Amendment to ERISA’s Anti-Alienation Rule, 68 SAINT JOHN’S L. REV.
667, 704–05 (1994).
98. Id. at 707.
99. Id. at 718–19.
100. Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: Amending the Anti-Alienation
Provision of ERISA Section 206(D), 80 OR. L. REV. 379, 380 (2001).
101. Id. at 388. For example, domestic support orders and breaches of fiduciary trust are exceptions
to the anti-alienation provision under ERISA. Id. at 392–99.
102. See id. at 399–404.
103. Id. at 412–13.
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unfortunate and claim to uphold economic protection for society.”104
Likewise, another proponent explains that permitting an employer to regain
the costs it contributed to an employee’s retirement account is different than
allowing third-party creditors to access such retirement accounts.105 An
employer extends contributions to an employee while that employee continues
to defraud the employer, thereby harming the employer that has no available
recourse.106 On the other hand, a creditor is able to monitor a debtor and suspend
credit if necessary, whereas it is much harder for an employer to monitor an
employee’s misconduct and take action before harm results.107 To ensure
undeserving employees do not enjoy retirement benefits at the expense of their
harmed employer, an amendment to ERISA’s anti-alienation provision should
permit garnishment if an employee is found guilty in court.108
As such, because the Supreme Court determined courts cannot find an
implied misconduct exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, Congress
should amend the ERISA to include an exception that permits alienation of
retirement benefits if an employee engages in misconduct or actions that harm
his employer.
3. A Misconduct Exception to the Anti-Alienation Rule
Similar to the arguments above that advocate for fraud, bankruptcy, and
criminal misconduct exceptions, other misconduct can be equally detrimental to
an employer. The NFL requires its “players, coaches, other team employees,
owners, game officials and all others privileged to work in the” NFL to abide
by its Personal Conduct Policy.109 The Personal Conduct Policy forbids (1)
criminal offenses, such as “the use or threat of violence; domestic
violence . . . theft . . . sex offenses; obstruction or resisting arrest; disorderly

104. Id. at 434–35.
105. Bonnie H. Rattner, Note, Employee Theft and ERISA: A Proposed Amendment to Garnish
Pension Benefits, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 315, 335–36 (1988).
106. Id. at 336.
107. Id. at 336–37.
108. Id. at 339.
109. NFL, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2014), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/Active%20Players/2014_Personal_Conduct_Policy.pdf [hereinafter PERSONAL
CONDUCT POLICY]. In December 2014, the NFL owners approved a new process for handling
violations of the Personal Conduct Policy. See NFL, THE NEW NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY
(2014),
http://i.usatoday.net/sports/nfl/2014-12-10-new-nfl-personal-conduct-policy.pdf;
Tom
Pelissero, NFL Owners Pass New Personal Conduct Policy, USA TODAY (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/12/10/roger-goodell-nfl-owners-personal-conductpolicy/20199033/.
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conduct; fraud; racketeering; and money laundering”; (2) “[c]riminal offenses
relating to steroids and prohibited substances”; (3) “[v]iolent or threatening behavior among employees”; (4) “[p]ossession of a gun or other weapon in any
workplace setting”; (5) “[c]onduct that imposes inherent danger to the safety
and well being [sic] of another person; and” (6) “[c]onduct that
undermines or puts at risk the integrity and reputation of the NFL, NFL clubs,
or NFL players.”110 If a player violates the Personal Conduct Policy, the NFL
may impose discipline, including “fines, suspension, or banishment from the
[NFL] and may include a probationary period and conditions that must be
satisfied prior to or following reinstatement.”111
Despite the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy and the discipline it imposes on
players for violations, player misconduct continues to occur. If the NFL could
alienate retirement benefits as an additional form of discipline against players
who violate the Personal Conduct Policy, there would be greater deterrence to
avoid prohibited conduct. Moreover, allowing the NFL or an NFL club to
rescind retirement benefits from a player who engages in misconduct ensures
the NFL or NFL team has a form of recourse against that player. As such,
Congress should amend ERISA to create an exception to the anti-alienation rule
that would allow employers to alienate an employee’s retirement benefits for
violating a provision of the employer’s policies, such as the NFL’s Personal
Conduct Policy.
Similar to violating the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy, when NFL players
engage in crimes such as domestic violence, drug use, or drunk driving, the
impact on the NFL and a respective NFL club is considerable. A player may be
suspended temporarily or indefinitely, which impacts a team’s ability to
compete.112 Furthermore, issues of violence deter fans, such as women, from
watching or supporting an NFL team or the NFL in its entirety.113 When a
player, or employee in general, engages in actions that cause substantial harm
to an employer, it is unjust to require an employer to continue providing that
employee with retirement benefits. Moreover, it does nothing to deter such

110. PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 109, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
111. Id. at 2.
112. See NFL Suspensions Taking a Heavy Toll on 2014 Already, SBNATION (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/7/3/5867515/nfl-suspensions-2014-robert-mathis-daryl-washington-lane-johnson.
113. See Ron Kroichick, Domestic Violence Rocks NFL Image, Threatens Brand, SFGATE,
http://www.sfgate.com/sports/kroichick/article/Domestic-violence-rocks-NFL-image-threatens-brand5753979.php (last updated Sept. 13, 2014); Linda Rubin & Gayle Sulik, NFL, Pink Ribbons Not Enough
to Win over Women, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/16/opinion/sulik-rubin-football-domestic-violence-awareness/ (last updated Oct. 16, 2014).
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misconduct from occurring in the future. As a result, Congress should amend
ERISA to include an exception to the anti-alienation provision that permits an
employer to recover payments made to an employee’s retirement plan if that
employee engages in misconduct that violates the employer’s conduct policies
or harms the employer. The exception would promote a fair and equitable
relationship between an employer and its employees, ensuring that an employee,
or player, who harms his employer or violates his employer’s policies is not
rewarded for his wrongdoing.
B. Amending ERISA to Allow for a Slayer Exception to the
Anti-Alienation Rule
Similar to an exception for employee misconduct, Congress should also
amend ERISA to include a slayer exception to the anti-alienation rule. A slayer
statute precludes an employee from receiving retirement benefits when an
employee is convicted of killing his or her spouse.114 A slayer exception to
ERISA would ensure that an employee who engages in heinous crimes, such as
murder, cannot benefit from his crime. Although the Supreme Court has not
expressly prohibited courts from inferring such an exception, an amendment to
ERISA would provide clear notice to employees that engaging in such conduct
can result in the loss of retirement benefits.
1. Judicial Treatment of State Slayer Statutes
As discussed previously, ERISA has preemption power over state laws
regulating employee benefit plans that interfere “too much” with plan
administration and regulation.115 The Supreme Court in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff
preempted a Washington statute regulating beneficiary status of probate assets
because it interfered too much with plan administration and regulation.116 The
Washington statute required that plan administrators be familiar with applicable
state laws when distributing benefits, rather than adhering to the retirement plan,
which the Supreme Court found greatly interfered with plan administration.117
Further, allowing each state to impose its own law interferes with ERISA’s
purpose of ensuring national uniformity among employee benefit administration

114. Caliendo, supra note 97, at 680.
115. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
660 (1995).
116. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 143, 148, 150 (2001).
117. Id. at 147–48.
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and regulation.118 The Supreme Court responded to the claim that its holding
also requires preemption of states’ slayer statutes, explaining
[t]hose statutes are not before us, so we do not decide the issue.
We note, however, that the principle underlying the
statutes-which have been adopted by nearly every State-is well
established in the law and has a long historical pedigree
predating ERISA. And because the statutes are more or less
uniform nationwide, their interference with the aims of ERISA
is at least debatable.119
Despite ERISA’s preemption power over state laws regulating employee
benefit plans, several courts have upheld state slayer statutes, permitting
alienation of retirement benefits for employees who violated the state statute.120
For example, in Mack v. Estate of Mack, Charla and Darren Mack were in the
midst of divorce proceedings when Darren shot and killed Charla.121 Nevada’s
slayer statute stated “a killer cannot profit or benefit from his wrong.”122 The
court held ERISA did not preempt Nevada’s slayer statute; thus, Darren could
not benefit from murdering Charla.123 In determining the statute was not
preempted, the court explained, “Congress did not intend ERISA to preempt
state laws that prohibit murderers from reaping financial benefits because of
their crimes.”124 Relying on precedent from the Second Circuit, the court
determined the Nevada statute was not preempted because it did “not affect the
determination of an employee’s eligibility for benefits.”125 The court’s decision
is consistent with several other courts that determined an employee convicted
of killing his or her spouse is not entitled to retirement benefits.126

118. Id. at 148.
119. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
120. See Radford, supra note 71, at 724–26.
121. 206 P.3d 98, 101, 104 (Nev. 2009).
122. Id. at 111.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 110 (referencing UNUM Ins. Co. of Am. v. Locke, 2006 WL 2457106 (W.D. La. Aug.
22, 2006); Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Conn. Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (W.D. Va. 2005); Admin. Comm. for the H.E.B. Inv.
& Ret. Plan v. Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761 (E.D. Tex. 2002); New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v.
Newman, 784 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (E.D. La. 1992); Mendez-Bellido v. Bd. of Tr. of Div. 1181, A.T.U.
N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund & Plan, 709 F. Supp. 329, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)).
125. Id.
126. See Caliendo, supra note 97, at 680 n.54.
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Conversely, some courts have held state slayer statutes are preempted by
ERISA. For instance, in Ahmed v. Ahmed, Lubaina Ahmed designated her
husband Nawaz Ahmed as the primary and secondary beneficiary of her life
insurance policy.127 Nawaz later killed Lubaina and was sentenced to death.128
Because of the confusion regarding who was listed as additional beneficiaries,
Lubaina’s two children disputed the insurance company’s decision.129 The Ohio
slayer statute dictated that no person who murdered an heir could receive
benefits from the murder,130 which in this instance would lead to only the one
child listed as a co-beneficiary receiving the policy benefits.131 However,
because the court found ERISA preempted the Ohio statute, that result was
inaccurate.132 The court reasoned that one of ERISA’s goals was to achieve
national uniformity in terms of plan benefits; as such, requiring plan
administrators to know every states’ applicable law and burden of proof would
impose too great of a burden on plan administrators.133 As a result, the court
held the Ohio statute was preempted by ERISA.134
2. Slayer Exception to the Anti-Alienation Rule
To resolve the dispute of whether state slayer statutes are preempted by
ERISA, Congress should enact an amendment to ERISA that permits an
exception to the anti-alienation provision. It is evident from the split of
authority that the courts in favor of upholding state slayer statutes are concerned
with the inequity of allowing a wrongdoer to benefit from his acts, while courts
in favor of preempting state slayer statutes are concerned with Congress’s intent
to ensure national uniformity among retirement plan administration and
regulation. Creating a slayer exception to the anti-alienation rule would satisfy
both concerns, so long as one national, uniform standard is enforced under
ERISA. As such, an exception should be enacted under ERISA to permit
alienation of retirement benefits for employees who violate the slayer provision
by committing murder.
Moreover, the misconduct and slayer exceptions should be enacted and
applied in light of one another. Although it may be uncommon for an NFL

127. 158 Ohio App. 3d 527, 2004-Ohio-5120, 817 N.E.2d 424, ¶ 5 (7th Dist.).
128. Id. ¶ 7.
129. Id. ¶ 8.
130. Id. ¶ 16.
131. Id. ¶ 17.
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶ ¶ 31, 35.
134. Id. ¶ 43.
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player to murder his spouse,135 subsequently reaping the rewards of their shared
retirement benefits, it begs the question of whether any person who commits
murder or similar heinous crimes, regardless of who the victim is, should receive
retirement benefits. When an employee commits such crimes, his actions are
detrimental to his employer. For example, when an employee commits a crime,
he may be forced to miss work, or more specifically, in the NFL, a player may
be suspended for his actions.136 Moreover, if an employee is arrested for, or
found guilty of, a crime, such as sexual assault or murder, his employer
experiences negative attention in response to the employee’s actions.137 In the
NFL, negative attention and publicity can have an even greater adverse impact
compared to the impact on an employer that is not constantly within the public’s
eye.
Despite an employee’s actions that harm his employer, an employer is still
required to contribute to an employee’s retirement plan. It is hard to imagine
that when Congress enacted ERISA to protect retirement benefits, it also meant
to punish employers by requiring them to pay retirement benefits to employees
who engaged in detrimental acts harmful to their employer. To ensure equitable
employment relationships and promote fairness, Congress should amend
ERISA to allow for misconduct and slayer exceptions to the anti-alienation rule,
allowing the NFL to seek retribution against players who harm the NFL or an
NFL club.
C. Looking to the Public Sector for Guidance
Although ERISA regulates only “private-sector retirement plans,”138 the

135. An unfortunate number of NFL players have murdered their girlfriends. See Armstrong, supra
note 46 (discussing how former Carolina Panthers wide receiver Rae Carruth conspired to have his
pregnant girlfriend murdered); Laura McCallister, Jovan Belcher Kills Himself in Front of Crennel,
Pioli After Thanking Them, KCTV5, http://www.kctv5.com/story/20234680/police-chiefs-playerskills-girlfriend-then-kills-self (last updated June 10, 2013) (discussing how former Kansas City Chiefs
linebacker Jovan Belcher shot himself after he shot and killed his girlfriend).
136. See generally 2014 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/finessuspensions/2014/suspensions/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (listing forty-nine NFL players’ suspensions
in 2014 for offenses ranging from “[v]iolating the NFL’s substance abuse policy” to “conviction for
intoxication manslaughter,” among many others).
137. See Carl Bialik, Have Ray Rice and Roger Goodell Hurt NFL Ratings?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Sept. 28, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/have-ray-rice-and-roger-goodell-hurt-nfl-ratings/
(stating that twenty-one percent of women and twenty-three percent of men viewed the NFL “less
favorably” due to the league’s handling of “domestic violence and child abuse allegations,” and fifteen
percent of both women and men were “less likely to watch” for the same reason); Linda Rubin & Gayle
Sulik, supra note 113 (discussing how it is hard for some women to support the NFL and its violence).
138. Frequently Asked Questions About Retirement Plans and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
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way in which the public sector handles pension forfeiture for employees who
engage in misconduct provides helpful guidance for how similar instances
should be handled in the private sector. The justifications for public officials’
pension forfeiture rest upon the ideals that pensions are intended for faithful
service; pension forfeiture is an appropriate punishment for breaching the public
trust and a deterrent for public corruption; and pension forfeiture holds symbolic
importance.139 As of June 2015, twenty-nine states have laws that permit
forfeiture of retirement benefits if public officials engage in some form of
misconduct relating to their service in office.140
Michael Steele, former mayor of Irvington, New Jersey, experienced the
magnitude of pension forfeiture after he accepted “$120,000 in kickbacks from
contractors” while in office.141 As a result of his misconduct, Steele was forced
to forfeit the entirety of his pension plan.142 Despite Steele’s argument that he
should only have to forfeit amounts received when the misconduct occurred, the
court found the entire pension amount was forfeited.143 Further, Steele was also
required to pay $120,000 in restitution.144 The harsh consequences Steele faced
exemplify the approach taken by several states in response to public officials’
misconduct.
Although public and private pension plans are regulated by different laws
and public pension plans are funded by taxpayers, as opposed to private
employers, the justifications for public pension forfeiture are relevant to the
private sector as well. Similar to public employers, private employers offer
retirement benefits to reward employees for faithful employment. It is unlikely
that an employer would want to reward an employee who later engages in
misconduct or harms the employer in some way. Additionally, withholding
retirement benefits could deter employee misconduct in the private sector, as
well as in the public sector. Despite the difference in regulating and funding of
pension plans, the justifications for retirement benefit forfeiture and alienation
are similar within the public and private sectors. As such, the public pension

139. James B. Jacobs, Coleen Friel & Edward O’Callaghan, Pension Forfeiture: A Problematic
Sanction for Public Corruption, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 76–80 (1997).
140 See generally NASRA, SELECTED STATE POLICIES GOVERNING TERMINATION OR
GARNISHMENT OF PUBLIC PENSIONS (2015), http://www.nasra.org/files/Compiled%20Resources/Forfeiture%20statutes.pdf.
141. MaryAnn Spoto, N.J. Public Employees Convicted of Misconduct Must Forfeit Pension
Accrued at Time of Crime, NJ (May 20, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/05/nj_panel_rules_public_employee.html.
142. Id. Steele had two pension plans, but only the second plan covered his employment when the
misconduct occurred. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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system may be a form of guidance for amending ERISA’s anti-alienation rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
In response to the growing amount of player misconduct in the NFL,
additional action must be taken to end the continuous violence and illegal
activity occurring off the playing field. While players are subject to suspensions
or fines for violating the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy, the egregious acts and
misconduct continue. This Comment explores the possibility of creating an
exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation provision that would allow the NFL or an
NFL club to recover retirement benefits paid to a player who engages in
misconduct or harms the NFL or an NFL club. The amendment would serve as
a deterrent for player misconduct, while also promoting a fair and equitable
employment relationship, allowing a wronged employer to seek retribution from
a player who engages in misconduct or harms the employer.
Because the Supreme Court determined there is not an implied misconduct
exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, an amendment is necessary to
allow for such an exception. The misconduct exception would ensure that
players who engage in misconduct or harm their employer are penalized for
their actions. Congress should amend the anti-alienation provision to also
permit a slayer exception that would be read in light of the misconduct exception
to ensure players who engage in criminal acts are not rewarded for their crimes.
Under the amended version of ERISA, NFL players would have an additional
reason to avoid actions that could risk their retirement benefits. Lastly, if
Congress is not convinced it should amend ERISA, it need only look to the
public sector for guidance. The NFL is a well-known and respected
organization; yet, the growing instances of player misconduct threaten that
prestige. In response, Congress should amend ERISA by creating a misconduct
exception that would allow for alienation of retirement benefits to ensure
equitable employment relationships and to reduce employee misconduct in the
NFL.

